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War is a costly enterprise. Not only in terms of human life, but also with regard 
to the purely pecuniary aspect of warfare. In the much-discussed book The 
Three Trillion Dollar War, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes esti-
mate that the financial cost to the U.S. government for the War on Terror excee-
ded three trillion dollars in 2008, the year of the book’s publication. This sum 
includes estimated costs of actual fighting as well as broader social, economic 
and health-care costs – for example for veteran pensions, death indemnities, 
higher oil prices and invalidity benefits. While extensive academic research has 
illustrated that the human cost of war strongly depresses the popularity of po-
litical leaders, few studies have looked into the political consequences of its fi-
nancial cost. Does the financial cost have an impact on leaders’ authority, for 
example? How and to what extent does the financial burden of warfare affect 
the popularity (or re-election potential) of incumbent political leaders? 
Given the human affliction brought about by war, it may seem insensitive to 
even consider the fact that war also entails significant financial burdens. Ne-
vertheless, survey-evidence illustrates that the financial aspect does carry 
weight in people’s assessment of a war. For example, in 2008, over 40 percent of 
Americans believed that U.S. defense and military spending was “too high” – a 
figure not reached since Vietnam and the final years of the Cold War. And re-
ports by the Congressional Research Service – as well as the Stiglitz book – as-
sessing the total costs of the Iraq War brought about significant political contro-
versy and media attention upon publication. While all this does not imply that 
politicians, the media or the public are insensitive to human losses, it demons-
trates forcefully that casualties are not their only consideration. Consequently, 
this sensitivity regarding the financial cost of warfare is likely to find its way 
into popular evaluations of political leaders. 
For the financial cost of warfare to affect public opinion it is evidently necessa-
ry to show several things: first of all that the financial costs of war are substan-
tial, that these costs are observed and understood by the public, and that fiscal 
policy affects incumbents’ approval ratings. The first point hardly needs subs-
tantiation – war is a costly enterprise. The second point, though crucial, is less 
straightforward. Accurate, reliable and complete data on the financial cost of 
military intervention is generally hard to obtain and estimates vary widely, 
even when provided by government agencies. For the ongoing War on Terror, for 
example, three U.S. government agencies have issued greatly diverging estima-
tes of its total cost so far. So how can the public be expected to find and absorb 
this information? Here, the media plays a crucial role. Indeed, they spend a sub-
stantial amount of time, effort and resources on portraying and discussing the 
financial costs of warfare, both directly and as a contextual interpretation of 
these data. For example, the New	York	Times argued in January 2007 that the cost 
of the Iraq War to date of printing the article could pay for an unprecedented 
public health campaign whilst leaving sufficient funds to fight poverty and sup-
port nation-wide preschool education programs. By providing both information 
and context, the media thus allows the public to be aware of and grasp the finan-
cial price of warfare.
Regarding the final condition (that fiscal policy affects incumbent popularity), 
extensive academic literature illustrates that this is true. These studies indicate 
that, on the whole, people favor budgetary austerity and dislike taxes and budget 
Kurzgefasst: Anhand von Datenmate-
rial aus den USA für die Zeit von 1948 
bis 2008 lässt sich zeigen, dass nicht 
nur der Verlust an Menschenleben, 
sondern auch die finanzielle Seite des 
Kriegführens die Popularität des je-
weiligen US-Präsidenten beeinflusst. 
Als Faustregel kann gelten: Je mehr 
ein Präsident für Kriege ausgibt, desto 
unbeliebter macht er sich. Dieser Ef-
fekt schwächt sich jedoch ab, wenn die 
Arbeitslosigkeit in den USA steigt. Das 
legt nahe, dass die amerikanische  Be-
völkerung unter wirtschaftlich un-
günstigen Bedingungen kriegsbeding-
te Ausgaben offenbar als Stimulus für 
die Volkswirtschaft betrachtet.    
Summary: War casualties often have a 
devastating effect on the popularity of 
political leaders. Yet, war also entails 
substantial fiscal outlays requiring 
funding either through increased debt 
or taxes. Using U.S. data for the period 
from 1948 to 2008, we illustrate that 
this fiscal side of war also affects the 
popularity of the incumbent U.S. pres-
ident. In general, the more he spends 
on war, the less popular he becomes. 
Such adverse effects of war-spending 
decrease, however, when unemploy-
ment rises. This suggests that under 
adverse economic conditions, the pub-
lic might see war-induced spending as 
a stimulus for the national economy.  
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deficits. As a consequence, public expenditure on war-related activities – which 
have to be financed either through taxes or budget deficits – are likely to affect 
incumbent approval ratings negatively.
For the empirical evaluation of just how fiscal policy affects popularity, it was 
assessed how presidential popularity in the U.S. from the first quarter of 1948 
to the third quarter of 2008 was affected by both the human and financial costs 
of warfare. The human cost is measured by counting the number of casualties 
suffered by the U.S. army in a given quarter in a given war. To approximate the 
financial burden of warfare, we estimate the level of Department of Defense 
(DoD) spending that arises solely because the United States is involved in a war 
that generates casualties. To do so, we estimate the trend in DoD spending over 
time to check how it is affected by economic and historical determinants. Then, 
this estimate is compared to true spending in wartime, and the difference defi-
ned as resulting from the involvement in warfare. 
The results, first of all, show that higher U.S. casualty counts significantly redu-
ce presidential approval ratings during the Korean, Vietnam, as well as the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars. However, such casualty effects are not totally indepen-
dent of the financial cost of warfare. Indeed, it is often the case that increasing 
human cost goes together with a higher financial cost of warfare due to repat-
riation costs, death indemnities, widow(er) pensions, health bills and, most obvi-
ously, the fact that a higher military presence generally requires higher budgets 
and leads to higher casualty numbers. In practical terms, this positive correlati-
on between both variables means we cannot properly interpret the effect of 
casualty numbers without considering the effect of the financial cost of warfa-
re. Looking at both variables simultaneously, we find that at least part of the 
strong U.S. casualty sensitivity actually reflects the effect of the financial cost of 
warfare. In other words, U.S. citizens not only punish their leaders for the hu-
man costs of war, but for its financial cost as well. 
Interestingly, this finding that both fiscal and human costs of warfare affect U.S. 
public opinion is particularly true for the Korean, Iraq and Afghanistan wars. 
During the Vietnam War, however, the casualty effect dominates, whereas the 
fiscal cost of the conflict plays no significant role. This suggests that the sheer 
number of casualties in this conflict – reaching levels well beyond the Korean, 
Iraq and Afghanistan wars put together – may have made voters insensitive to 
the financial side of the conflict. This strong reaction to casualty numbers du-
ring the Vietnam War has been documented before and is generally referred to 
as the “Vietnam Syndrome.” Although this is hard to evaluate based on our limi-
ted number of conflicts, our results regarding the Vietnam War may well indi-
cate that, once a certain threshold is surpassed in terms of casualty numbers, 
the fiscal cost of the military conflict loses relevance.
A second central finding is that the financial cost of war can strongly affect the 
popularity of political leadership in the U.S. Specifically, it becomes evident that 
the fiscal burden of the Korean War had significant negative impact on presi-
dential popularity, although a similar effect following the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq appears much weaker and remains fully absent during the Vietnam 
War. One potential explanation for this divergence is that war has become rela-
tively less expensive for the United States over time. The Vietnam, Afghanistan 
and Iraq wars are much less expensive relative to the U.S. gross domestic pro-
duct than the Korean War, World War II or the Civil War. 
Finally, whether or not the impact of war-induced spending is affected by eco-
nomic conditions is also evaluated. To this end, spending variables are compared 
with unemployment levels. They indicate that high unemployment indeed miti-
gates the negative effect of war-induced spending on incumbent popularity. In 
the absence of unemployment, war-induced spending significantly depresses 
incumbent popularity. Increasing levels of unemployment mitigate the effect of 
additional war spending on presidential popularity. When the unemployment 
rate surpasses five percent, additional war spending even starts to have a posi-
tive effect on presidential popularity – though such positive effects never reach 
statistical significance. 
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While these results support the theoretical argument that, under adverse eco-
nomic conditions, the public might see war-induced spending as a stimulus for 
the national economy, further questions arise. First, given the use of a fairly 
rudimentary measure of war-spending (extracted from the United States’ DoD 
spending), more precise measurement of the financial cost of war needs to be 
developed and its impact tested. Second, future work should address whether 
(and to what extent) the source of this additional spending – borrowing, taxation 
or simply printing money – matters for public opinion. One hypothesis is that 
current tax increases are often found to be politically more costly than deferred 
tax increases like borrowing. Third, recent research has shown that conditions 
such as perceptions of success, casualty framing, domestic (or international) 
political and media support and elite consensus or dissensus affect casualty 
sensitivity and public support for the use of military force. One asks to what 
extent similar effects hold for war-related spending. 
Peace and prosperity are generally acknowledged to be the two key determi-
nants of the electorate’s judgment of its leader(s). Prosperity is mostly measured 
through economic indicators such as gross domestic product growth, unem-
ployment levels or inflation. In studying the effects of peace and war, scholars 
have consistently depended on casualty counts. The present contribution illust-
rates that this might be overly restrictive and that the pecuniary cost of war 
also plays a key role in shaping the popularity of a warring incumbent.
References
Gartner,	Scott	Sigmund:	“The	Multiple	Effects	of	Casualties	on	Public	Support	of	War:	
An	Experimental	Approach”.	In:	American	Political	Science	Review,	Vol.	102,	No.	1,	
2008,	S.	95-106.
Geys,	Benny/Vermeir,	Jan:	“Taxation	and	Presidential	Approval:	Separate	Effects	
from	Tax	Burden	and	Tax	Structure	Turbulence?”.	In:	Public	Choice,	Vol.	135,	Nos.	
3-4,	2008,	S.	301-317.
Geys,	Benny:	“Wars,	Presidents	and	Popularity:	The	Political	Costs	of	War	Re-	
examined”.	In:	Public	Opinion	Quarterly,	Vol.	74,	No.	2,	2010,	S.	357-374.
Stiglitz,	Joseph/Bilmes,	Linda:	The	Three	Trillion	Dollar	War:	The	True	Cost	of	the	
Iraq	Conflict.	New	York:	W.	W.	Norton	2008.
[Foto:	David	Ausserhofer]
Benny Geys is Associate 
Professor in micro- 
economics at the Norwe-
gian Business School BI 
in Oslo and scientific  
coordinator of the Future 
of Fiscal Federalism  
research project at the 
WZB. Beginning October 
2011, he will also be  
Research Professor in 
micro-level socialisation 
and civic engagement at 
the Vrije Universiteit 
Brussels.
benny.geys@bi.no
